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TREATIES MADE UNDER AUTHORITY OF U. S.

TREATIES MADE OR WHICH SHALL BE MADE
UNDER THE AUTHORITY OF THE UNITED
STATES
By JOSEPH WHITLA STINSON

1

17-78, the confederation of the United States of America
came into existence, by compact of the thirteen original colonies. By the articles of confederation the states severally and
mutually pledged their faith to abide -by the determination of the
United States in Congress assembled in all questions that were
thereby made subject to their deliberation and control. The authority of Congress included especially the power of "entering
upon treaties and alliances," with the proviso that no treaty of
commerce should be made whereby the legislative power of the
respective states would suffer restraint in respect to the imposition of such imposts and duties upon foreigners as their own
people were subject to or from prohibiting the exportation
or importation of any species of goods or commodities whatsoever. This limitation upon the power of Congress to make treaties -of commerce is reflected in early American treaties beginning
with the treaties of Amity and Commerce with France of 1778,2
and extending somewhat beyond the formation of the federal
government under the constitution. The preamble of the Treaty
of Commerce with France of 1778, Adams writes, "laid the cornerstone to our subsequent intercourse with foreign nations and
was to the rest of mankind what the declaration of independence
was to our internal government." 3 There was no reciprocity of
duties established by these treaties. Until 1815, we have in general but two classes of treaties made by the United States during this early period,--those with England in which none of the
neutral rights are recognized; and those with the great powers of
continental Europe, in which all the pritcipal neutral doctrines
are secured by specific stipulation.' Until 1815, treaty control
N

'Member of the New York Bar, practitioner in admiralty, contributor
to 2many American and European reviews.
The treaty of alliance with France of 1778 was concluded before the
articles
of confederation came into effect.
3
Moore, Prin. Am. Diplomacy 107, 108.
'Lyman, Diplomacy of the United States 146.
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of commerce rested in the almost universal modern arrangement
and in the old diplomatic phrase of gentis amicissimae. Thereafter reciprocity of duties and tonnage charges on imports becomes the basis of commercial treaties.
"The law of March 3, 1815, is the ancestor of numerous subsequent laws which proposed to foreign nations terms of equality
and reciprocity on duties upon the tonnage of vessels and the
goods they carried to become effective by executive proclamation
whenever the discriminations of such foreign nations operating
to the disadvantage of the United States should be abolished." 5
Some of these general laws remain unrepealed as section 4228
of the Revised Statutes. This brief survey shows the treatypower, as first exercised, to have been characterized by a limitation
upon Congress, touching commerce and navigation, and at
the same time the agency of the treaty-authority was exerted in
the extension of an obligatory law of nations, particularly directed to the freedom of neutral commerce.
The method of negotiation had aspects of really great consequence. Draft-forms of. the pre-constitufion treaties were prepared with great care by the committee of foreign affairs of the
Continental Congress, a committee first known as the committee
of foreign correspondence and its instructions were followed by
the American plenipotentiaries abroad, perhaps the only serious
departure from this rule being the exercise of individual discretion by Jay; Adams and the reluctant acquiesence of Franklin in
the secret negotiation of a separate peace with Great Britain, it
being known to them that both France and Spain were seeking
to advance their own interests, to the prejudice of the young
American nation. Under this practice and that of Washington's
administration, to negotiate treaties "by and with advice and consent of the Senate," the United States possessed no grounds in
international law or faith to decline to ratify treaties negotiated
by the executive department or for their conditional or partial
acceptance. When it became the custom to seek sanction of the
Senate subsequent to the negotiation of treaties by the chief executive, the right of the Senate to reject, amend or reserve
treaties was vigorously defended to save the constitutional provision from becoming an empty form and has ever since been
sustained.
The treaty authority as granted to the Continental Congress, it
will be noted, extended to the making of treaties and alliances. 6
555 An. L.

Rev. 68, 72.
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The distinction is not observed with any uniformity by writers
and commentators upon the constitution of the United States.

An alliance is a union of interests, offensive or defensive; a
league, coalition or federation which may be effected by compact

or treaty between sovereign states. The Pinckney plan outlined
the federal government as:
"A confederation between the free and independent states of
. . . solemnly made uniting them together under one general
superintending government for their common benefit and for
their defense and security against all the designs and leagues that
may be injurious to their interests and7 against all forc[e] and
attacks offered to or made upon them."
The authority to make alliances is a federative power.8 It is
in that sense to be distinguished from a law-making power.
Hamilton classified the treaty-power as an executive authority,
"the force of law being .annexed to the result," a power commensurate with all those objects to which the legislative power is extended which are the proper subjects of compact with foreign
nations. But its application is wider: Mr. justice Holmes declares :9 "It is obvious that there may be matters of the sharpest
exigency for the national well being that an act of Congress could
not deal with, but that a treaty followed by such an act could,"
as where a national interest can be protected in concert with another power. And it is to be observed that the chief executive
shares here with the states, as equally represented in the Senate,
something more than either a power to execute the laws or to
make them: it is "a power which must belong to and somewhere
reside in every civilized government,1 ° a supreme attribute of

sovereignty." '
The constitution declared that no state shall "enter into any
treaty, alliance or confederation,"' 2 and in a subsequent clause of
the same section, that no state shall "without the consent of
8The declaration of independence asserted the power of the free and independent states to "levy war, conclude peace, contract alliances, establish
commerce, and do all other acts and things which independent states may
of right do."
72 Farrand, Records of the Fed. Cony. 134.
8
Locke, Two Treatises of Government, ch. xii, sec. 143, 144, 146.
9
Missouri v. Holland, (1919) 252 U. S. 416, 433, 64 L. Ed. 641, 40
S. C. .R. 382.
'OAndrews v. Andrews, (1902) 188 U. S. 14, 33, 47 L. Ed. 366, 23
S. C. R. 237.
"De Lima v. Bidwell, (1900) 182 U. S. 218, 45 L. Ed. 1041, 21
S. C. R. 743.
12Art. 1, sec. 10.
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Congress . . . enter into any agreement or compact with another
state, or with a foreign power." Here the words "alliance or
confederation" are not used, so that the prohibition is absolute except as to agreements or compacts which may be made with the
consent of Congress. This distinction is further emphasized by
the fact that on Sept. 14, 1787, in the federal convention, the first
mentioned clause was altered to read--"no state shall enter any
treaty alliance or confederation."' 3 It is apparent that the prohibition upon states is absolute with respect to the entering upon
a treaty alliance or confederation, but conditional with respect to
agreements or compacts which are not trekties, alliances or confederations. With these limitations upon the power of the
states in mind, it is important to consider how far the treatypower as granted by the constitution is subject to necessary retraint."
The constitution provides only that the president shall have
power "by and with the advice and consent of the Senate to make
treaties, 5 provided that two-thirds of the senators present concur.""' Treaties of alliance were however within the contemplation of the convention. To the Senate was attributed in early
drafts of the proposed constitution, the power to make treaties
132 Farrand, Records of the Fed. Cony. 619. "The first of these prohibitions, is absolute and unqualified, and completely excludes all power
in the states to make treaties with foreign nations on any subject whatever."
"The second prohibition forbids the states, without the consent of Congress, to enter into any agreement or compact 'with a foreign pdwer.' The
agreement or compact as here referred to, is not identical with a formal
treaty, which is absolutely forbidden in the previous clause . . . The
words mean any arrangement, negotiation, agreement, or compact with a
foreign power, though it should not amount to a treaty in the strict sense.
1 Butler, Treaty-making Power of the U. S. "35 citing S. T. Spear. The
author might have added "or which does not amount to an alliance or
confederation."
14 "It would not.be-pretended that -under the confederation the powers
of Congress--f- formulate 'treaties and alliances' were more extensive
than those of the president and Senate under the constitution to form
'treaties,' " speech of Mr. Sedgwick, debate on Jay treaty, 4 Annals of
Congress, col. 527.
' 5 "In the constitution and laws of the United States, the word 'treaty'
-auenstein
has no special meaning, different from the general definition."
v. Lynham, (1879) 100 U. S. 483, 489, 25 L. Ed. 628. "The treaty is a contract of both parties," Marshall in Meigs v. McClung's Lessee, (1815)
9 Cranch (U. S.) 11, 3 L. Ed. 639, it "must contain the whole contract
between the parties," New York.Indians v. United States, (1898) 170
U. S. 1, 42 L. Ed. 927, 18 S. C. R. 531 ; Fourteen Diamond Rings v. United
States, (1901) 183 U. S. 176, 46 L. Ed. 138, 22 S. C. R. 59. "Generally
a treaty is defined to be a compact made between two or more independent
nations with a view to public welfare." Altman & Co. v. United States,
(1912) 224 U. S, 583, 600, 56 L. Ed. 894, 32 S. C. R. 593.
16 Art. 2, sec. 2.
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of commdrce, of peace, and of alliance. 7 Madison sought to
lessen the difficulties of making treaties of peace,18 urged the inconvenience of requiring a legal ratification of treaties of alliance
for the purposes of war 9 and suggests consideration of whether
"a distinction might be made between different sorts of treaties
allowing the president and the Senate to make treaties eventual
[contingent] and of alliance for limited terms and requiring the
concurrence of the whole legislature in other treaties." May a
distinction be made here as to the authority of the federal government to make alliances and to conclude treaties of limited alliance? Blackstone so differentiated: "It is also the King's prerogafive to make treaties, leagues and alliances." 20 If, as he says,
a league to be binding on the whole community must be made by
the sovereign power, the treaty power in this federative capacity
implies more than an authority constrained to constitutional
guaranties, and a "plentitude of authority" which must contemplate a conjunction of expressly and impliedly granted sovereign
powers as well as those residuary in the people, and the states,
something not apparent in the grant to the president and Senate
to make treaties, as distinguished from alliances, which is essentially a derivative authority of the powers of war and peace.
There is then at common law a distinction between ai act of unlimited sovereign power and the authority of the United States
to make treaties, and "the nature and extent of the authority
granted by the constitution must in .the absence of positive law

'21
be governed exclusively by the common law."

Article 6 of the constitution22 declares that "this constitution,
and the laws made in pursuance thereof ; and all treaties made or
which shall be made under the authority of the United States
shall be the supreme law of the land." Mr. Justice Holmes has
recently raised the question 23 whether there is any other test

under American law of the validity of a treaty than the formal
requisities for concluding it, implying that significance might
Farrand, Records of the Fed Cony. 144-5, 155.
Farrand, Records of the Fed. Cony. 540.
Farrand, Records of the Fed. Cony. 392.
Blackstone, Commentaries 257.
"United States v. Coolidge, (1813) 1 Gall. (C.C.) 488, Fed. Cas. No.
14,857; Blackstone, Commentaries par. 158, par. 798, par. 1645.
22Marshall, in Cohens v. Virginia, (1821) 6 Wheat. (U. S.) 264, 381, 5
L. Ed. 285, declares "this is the authoritative language of the American
and if gentlemen please, of the American states."
people,
23
Missouri v. Holland, (1919) 252 U. S.416, 64 L. Ed. 641, 40 S.C. R.
382.
172

1s2
192
201
2

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

attach to the declaration in the constitution that treaties are "the
supreme law of the land" when made "under the authority of the
United States, ' 24 while acts of Congress are similarly honored
only when made in pursuance of the constitution. 25 The vari24
Debate on Jay treaty, House of Representatives, March 1796, Annals
of Congress, IV, 1st sess. Col. 450, 451, Mr. Heath: "Great stress is laid
upon the constitution declaring treaties laws of the land. ( . . .quot. art.
6, sec. 2.) Hence it is obvious that the supremacy of the law is over the
constitution and laws of the separate states, which was necessary to prevent these interfering with those. But it does not affect the powers of this

House, as a component part of the Gen. Legislature, and the. authority of
the United States. It is also .worth while to notice the gradation in this
article . . . How absurd the doctrine then, that these'last (treaties),
third in order, can repeal the second (laws). At that rate, all power
whatever, would remain vested in two branches of the government; the
third with all its powers of originating bills for raising revenues would be
dwindled into a mere board of assessors. If neither of the powers ought
to possess, directly or indirectly, an overruling influenc6 over others,
whence is the power to be deduced of the president and states by treaty,
to make laws possessing this very overruling influence over this House?
Gallatin urged: "The clause by no means expresses that treaties are equal
or superior to laws of the Union, or that they shall be supreme law when
clashing with any of them." (Col. 469). Madison (Col. 488.) observed:
"On comparing the several passages in the constitution, which has been
already cited to the committee, it appeared that if taken literally, and without limit, they must necessarily clash with each other. Certain powers to
regulate commerce, to declare war, to raise armies, to borrow money, etc.,
are first estecially vested in Congress., The power of making treaties
which may relate to the same subjects, is afterwards vested in the president, and two thirds of -the Senate; and it is declared, etc., (Art. 6).
... The term supreme as applied to treaties, evidently meant a
supremacy over the state constitutions and the laws, and not over the
constitution and laws of the United States. And it was observable, that
the judicial authority and the existing laws, alone of the states, fell within
the supremacy expressly enjoined. The injunction was not extended to the
legislative authority of the states or to laws requisite to be passed by the
states' for giving effect to treaties; . . . etc. Mr. Bourne observed:
"Laws contrary to the constitution are nugatory, and treaties contrary to
existing laws, the same; because when in that stage, they are not concluded under the authority of the United States, (and there is no lbnger
any clashing) (Supra. Col. 578) ......
.Mr. Hillhouse declared (Col.
669) : "Great stress has been laid on the woids, under the authority of
the United States, and in the sixth article, which declares etc. . . . as
importing something more than what could be done by the president and
Senate, and as pointing- to the legislative powers of Congress; a little attention t6 -the subject .will show that those words are n6t used in that place
for the purpose of limitation, but as descriptive of the kind of treaties
intended. Under the c6nfederation, the states had reserved a right, with the
consent of Congress, to make treaties; it would not- have done, therefore,
to have used the word "treaties" only, for that might have included other
treaties than those made by the United States. The Continental Congress
would not answer; for that would have excluded treaties made under this
government; it would not have -done to have used the words jresident
and Senate; that would have excluded treaties made by the old Congress.
The words "under the authority of the United States," are the only words
that could give a definite and concise description of the treaties intended.
Tt.will be well to inquire where is the authority in the United States. Not
in Congress, but in the people."
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ance in the words descriptive of laws and treaties is not entirely
satisfactorily accounted for by Rawle 8 as designed to include
within the sanction of the constitution at the time of its adoption
those treaties already in existence which had been made by Congress under the confederation, the continuing obligation of which
it was proper to declare :27
"The words 'under the authority of the United States' were
considered as extending equally to [those] treaties previ6usly
made and to those which should subsequently be effected, but
although the former could not be considered as pursuant to a
constitution which was not then in existence, the latter would
not be 'under the authority of the United States' unless they
are conformable to its constitution."
The authority of the United States is thus seen to have been
retroactive; it assimilated prior contracts or compacts of the
United States to the supreme obligation of law under the newly
framed constitution. The federal convention at one stage adopted
the clause:
"This constitution and the laws of the United States made in
pursuance thereof and all treaties made under the authority of
the United States shall be the supreme
2 8 law of the several states
and of their citizens and inhabitants."
As first considered this clause read:
"That the legislative acts of the United States made by virtue
and in pursuance of the articles of union, and all treaties made
and ratified under the authority of the United States shall be the
25

Iredell in Debates in North Carolina Convention: "When treaties are
made they become as valid as legislative acts. I apprehend that every act
of the government, legislative or executive is good if in pursuance of a Con-

stitutional power and the law of the land ;" see also 4 Annals of Congress,

Debate on Jay Treaty. This appears to have been the opinion of Jay, as

communicated by letter to the Congress of the confederation, 1788.
26Rawle,
Constitution 66.
27
The Supreme Court of the United States, Judge Chase speaking, declared in Ware v. Hylton, (1796) 3 Dall. (U. S.) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568; "Four
things are apparent on a view of this sixth article of the national constitution. First: That it is retrospective, and is to be considered in the same
light as if the constitution had been established before the making of the
treaty of 1783. Second: That the constitution or laws of any of the states
so far as either of them shall be found contrary to that treaty are prostrated before the treaty.. Third: That consequently the treaty of 1783 has
superior power to the legislature of any state, because no legislature of
any state has any kind of power over the constitution which was its
creator. Fourth: That it is the declared duty of the state judges to determine any constitution or laws of any state contrary to that treaty, or
any other, made under the authority of the United States, null and void.
National or federal judges are bound by duty and oath to'the same conduct."
282

Farrand, Records of the Fed. Cony. 417, 572.
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supreme law of the respective states, so far as those acts or
treaties shall relate to the said states 'or their citizens and inhabitants."
It has been held that there are inherent limitations upon the
authority of the United States to make treaties ;23 that the treaty
power, as a delegated authority "cannot alter the constituting
power;" "on natural principles a treaty which would manifestly
betray and sacrifice the private interest of the state would be
null ;30 nothing can be done by the treaty-making power . . .
which robs a department of the government, or of any of the
states, of its constitutional authority ;31 it is limited' by all the provisions of the constitution which inhibit certain acts from being
done by the government or any of its departments of which description there are many ;,132 "though the power is general and restricted," says Story, "it is not to be so construed as to destroy
the fundamental laws of the state."3 3 As affirmatively expressed
by the Supreme Court of the United States :3sa "It is impossible to conceive that where conditions are brought about to which
any particular provision of the constitution applies, its controlling
influence may be frustrated by the action of any or all the departments of government;" even where there is no direct command of the constitution which applies, "there may nevertheless
be restrictions of so fundamental a nature that cannot be transgressed although not expressed in so many words of the constitution . . . In the nature of things, limitations of this character

cannot be transcended, 'because of the complete absence of
29
Gallatin based the limitation upon the authority to make treaties in
all limited governments upon the law of nations:
"The law of nations, the practice under the articles of confederation,
the opinions of individuals, and of conventions, had been conjured up as
uniting in ascribing to the powers of making treaties the most unlimited
and unbounded effect. . . . in all limited governments, where the
powers of making treaties and laws were lodged in 'different hands, the
first never had, by its nature, swallowed up and absorbed the legislative;
but it would be found universally that the manner in which that power
was exercised in such governments, when the conditions of the compact
with the foreign nation were of a legislative nature, was, not by superseding, but only by calling to itq aid andassistance the legislature, without
whose consent the executive was not enabled to fulfill the conditions' of the
compact, and secondly this doctrine was perfectly well understood, as he
stated it, by all nations, and therefore constituted a part of the law of
nations. Vattel, book I, Chap. 21, Book II, Chap. 14 Book IV; 2; Debate
on Jay Treaty; 4 Annals of Congress, 1796, Col. 72i.
31°Hamilton, Camillus Papers no. 35, 5 Hamilton's Works, Lodge Ed. 301.
Cooley, Constitutional Limitations 117.
32
Calhoun, see Tucker, Limitations on Treaty-Making Power.
8
sSory, Commentaries art. 1508.
33aDownes v. Bidwell, (1900) 182 U. S. 244, 45 L. Ed. 1088, 21 S. C. R.
770.
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power." "A treaty cannot change the constitution or be held
valid if in violation of that instrument."3' 4
A test then of the validity of a treaty is its conformity to expressed or implied constitutional limitations; but this is not the
sole measure of the validity of treaties. Another, very material
to their obligation as the supreme law of the land, as well as to
that of their legislative abrogation, is their conformity to, or constructive operation as the law of nations. It was urged before
the North Carolina Convention, July 28, 17783' and the view is
consonant with authority that "although treaties are mere conventional acts between nations, yet by the law of nations, they
are the supreme law of the land to their respective citizens or
subjects." In a debate on the Jay treaty, March, 1796, House of
Representatives, Mr. Harper declared:
"A distinction here ought to be observed between the law of
nations and municipal law. The former is the province of
treaties, the latter of the legislative power . . . In all subjects,
then, relative to the law of nations, to matters external, to the
conduct of nations towards each other, treaties are lawsand pro8
duce immediately and indirectly the effect of laws.1

The distinction is material and emphasizes at this time the
abandonment of "the higher ground that commercial treaties
were not when ratified the supreme law of the land."3 7 Marshall
had urged in the debates in the Virginia Legislature that the Jay
treaty in all its commercial parts was still under the power of the
House of Representatives.
In the debate in 1796 on the Jay treaty, the eighteen articles,
succeeding the first ten, having for their manifest object the regulation of "external commerce and navigation,"3" the question
was as to the power of the House of Representatives in respect to
commercial treaties made by thd president and Senate. It was
admitted that the House had not right to make treaties, however
debatable was the treaty power in reference to regulation of
commerce; and it was questioned whether the discretion of the
House to judge with respect to effecting such treaties did not in
effect imply an instrumentality in the making of such compacts. 9
84

Downes v. Bidwell, (1900) 182 U. S. 244,287, 45 L. Ed. 1088, 21 S. C. R.

770; see also Geofroy v. Riggs, (1889) 133 U. S. 258, 33 L. Ed. 642, 10
S. C. R. 295.
254 Elliot's Debates 119-144.
8
"Annals of the Fourth Congress, 1st Sess., 1795-96.
37Story, Miscellaneous Writings 193.
384 Hamilton's Works, Lodge Ed. 475.
8
eAnnals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Sess., Col. 454.
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Gallatin defined an unconstitutional treaty to be one providing
for the doing of that, forbidden by the constitution, and urged
that if a "treaty embraces objects within the sphere of the general powers delegated to the federal government, but whivh have
been exclusively granted to a particular branch of government,
say to the legislative department, though not unconstitutional, it
does not become the law of the land until it has obtained the
sanction of that branch."40 On the other hand the contention
was that the treaty-making power was an authority paramount
to the legislative power, and that the positive institutions of the
Legislature must give place to compact; that the very object of
the treaty power was to remove by contract with foreign nations,
those legislative impediments which embarrass that intercourse,
the argument being that the people could repeal laws made by one
agency quite properly by another. One member observed that
there had been no explicit determination of the sense in which
treaties ought to be considered the supreme law of the land.
Madison admits it is uniformly agreed that sovereignty resides
in the people and defines the question as referring to the manner
in which the will of the people had divided the powers delegated,
and the construction that would best reconcile the several parts
of the constitution with each other, and be most consistent with
its general spirit and object. He thought the treaty power too
greatly narrowed if it be regarded as moving in. a separate orbit
from the legislative authority; that it was impracticable to regard the former as a concurrent power with the latter; since "a
treaty of commerce would rarely be made that would not trench
40"The general power of making treaties, undefined as it is by the clause
which grants it, may be either expressly limited by some other positive

clauses of the constitution, or it may be checked by some powers vested
in other bra.nches of the government, which although not diminishing, may
control the treaty-making power . . . . The treaty-making power is
limited by the constitution when in the first section it is said that AL.
legislative power is granted to Congress . . . Shall a treaty repeal a
liaw or a law a treaty? Neither can a law repeal a.treaty, because a treaty
is made with -the concurrence of another party-a foreign nation-that Pas
no participation in framing the law; nor can a treaty made by the president
and Senate. repeal a law, for the- same reason, because the House of
Representatives have a participation in making the law. -It is a sound
maxim of government that it requires the same power to repeal a law
that enacted it. If so, then it follows that laws and treaties are not of the
same nature; that both operate as the law of the land, but under certain
limitations; both are subject to the control. of the constitution; they are
made -not only by different powers, but those powers are distributed, under
different modifications, among the several branches of the government.
Thus no law could be made by the legislature giving themselves power to
execute it, and no treaty by' the executive embracing objects specifically
assigned to the legislature withotit their assent."
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on existing legal regulations as well as be a bar to future ones;"
that to regard each of them as supreme over the latter involved
the "absurdity of an imperium in imperio," of two powers both
supreme, yet each of them liable to be superseded by the other,
likening the case to the conflict of laws between the comitia
curiata and the comitia tributa of Roman days; he urges with
great finality that to regard the treaty power as both unlimited
in its objects and completely paramount in its authority would be
to give it a latitude necessarily prohibited by regard to the general form and -fundamental principles of the constitution. It
may be observed that so far as the law of nations, the universal
sanction and usage of civilized nations, consists with the constitution, treaties affirming the understandings thereof, would not,
if admitted to be of paramount obligation, infringe the constitution or delegated authorities. Madison finally submits the power
of Congress may be viewed as co6perative with the treaty power
on the legislative subjects submitted to Congress by the constitution, favoring the view of Mr. Gallatin, a view not inconsistent
with the principle that no statute' of one or two nations can
change the law of nations. That the treaty power embraced all
subjects arising under the law of nations, and for the mutual protection of the citizens in their correspondence with each other
was admitted, but it was pointed out that the law of nations admitted causes which would justify a nation in departing from,
or refusing to execute treaties; and that Congress in their legis41
lative capacity were judges of those causes.
Marshall in Foster v. Neilson4 2 held that "our constitution declares a treaty to be a law of the land. .It is consequently to be
regarded in courts of justice as equivalent to an act of legislature, whenever it operates of itself, without the aid of any leg4
islative provision." Mt. Justice Baldwin in Pollard v. Kibbe 3
comments upon Marshall's opinion and declares in a concurring
opinion that it was silent on the law of nations as in former adjudications; yet it will not be pretended that it was meant to controvert or abrogate those principles which are consecrated by "the
usage of the civilized world." The significance of this qualification is seen when the power of Congress to abridge the law of
nations is considered, and the inference is unavoidable in Mar41Hillhouse, Annals of Congress, 4th Congress, 1st Sess. Col. 669.
2 (1829) 2 Pet. (U. S.) 253, 314, 7 L. Ed. 415.
43(1840) 14 Pet. (U. S.) 353, 402, 10 L. Ed. 490.
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shall's opinion in United States v.Percheman" that it was the rule
of the "universally received doctrine of nations" entering into
the Florida Cession treaty which gave it executed obligation.
In Taylor v. Morton 45 the "necessary prerogative of a nation" to
abrogate treaties constituting municipal law of the United States
is asserted to remain in Congress "whenever they relate to subjects which the constitution has placed under the legislative
power," of which the law of nations is not one. This opinion
is reflected in that of the Supreme Court48 wherein Mr. Justice
Field holds:
"If a treaty operates by its own force and relates to a subject within the power of Congress it can be deemed in that particular only the equivalent of a legislative act to be repealed or
modified at the pleasure of Congress."
The obligation of treaties as municipal law by the constitution must then be distinguished from their obligations under the
general law of nations.
This distinction is not taken in the Head Money Cases47
where it was held that:
"So far as a treaty made by the United States with any foreign nation can be the subject of cognizance in the courts of the
United States, it will be subject to such acts as Congress may
pass for its enforcement, modification, or repeal."
48
So reiterated the Supreme Court in Whitney v. Robertson.
Thus the doctrine has grown up without express qualification
that: "A treaty may supersede a prior act of Congress and an
act of Congress may supersede a prior treaty." 49 But the Supreme Court has declared that acts of Congress are to be construed "in the light of the purpose of the government to act
within the limitations of international law ;5" that "no statute of
one or two nations can create obligations for theoworld;"5l and
as the principle is as controlling today as when the constitution
44(1833)

7 Pet. (U. S.) 51, 88, 8 L. Ed. 604.

45(1855) 2 Curtis (C. C.) 454, 459, Fed. Gas. No. 13, 799.
46Chae

Chan Ping v. United States, (1888) 130 U. S.581, 32 L. Ed. 1068,

9 S. C. R. 623.
47(1884) 112 U. S.580, 28 L. Ed. 798, 5 S. C. R. 247.
48(1887) 124 U. S.190, 31 L. Ed. 386, 8 S. C. R. 456.
459Shiras, 169, 271.
9MacLeod v. United States (1912) 229 U. S. 416, 57 L. Ed. 1260, 33
S. 51C. R. 955.
The Scotia, (1871) 14 Wall. (U. S.) 170, 187, 20 L. Ed. 822; The
Paquette Habana, (1900) 175 U. S. 677, 711, 44 L. Ed. 320, 20 S. C. R.
290; In re petition of the Long Island North Shore Passenger & Freight
Transportation Co., (1881) 5 Fed. 599, 622.
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was framed that: "The municipal laws of a country cannot
change the law of nations so as to bind the subjects of another
5' 2
nation.
A distinction is unavoidable between the mere authority to
make and ratify treaties and the authority to give to treaties
paramount legal obligation consistent alike with the constitution
and with international law. It is not sufficient to rest this distinction on that between executory and executed treaties ;53 nor
between contractual treaties and treaties forming an international
legal order. As between executed and executory treaties, that
the former may be repealed as other federal enactments" they
must not only be effective without aid of Congress or the executive or judicial department, but must touch the subject matter of
the legislative power of the United States; and it is apparent that
though of executed obligation in the sense that they constitute
enforceable municipal law, such treaties may nevertheless contribute to an international legal order and so become of paramount authority under the constitution and the American doctrine of international law. Marshall held :55
"An act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate
the law of nations if any other possible construction remains,
and consequently can never be construed to violate neutral rights,
or to affect neutral commerce further than is warranted by the
law of nations as understood in this country."
Insofar as the treaty power transcends the domestic purposes of ordinary legislation, its means are characterized by the
contraction of permanent obligations of general effect.5 6 Marshall has refused to admit a construction of the constitution,
with relation to the binding force of the accepted usages of
nations at the time the constitution was framed which would
fetter the war time powers of Congress or its discretion as to the
making of reprisals; but this view is subject to his opinion in
United States v. Perchenman if not reversed by this decision, according to Professor John Bassett Moore.5 7 That a general right
derived under the constitution "by the rigor of the law of nations
and the common law,"58 is restrained by the modern usage of
52

Miller v. Ship Resolution, (1781) 2 Dall. 1,.4, 11 L. Ed. 263.
Jnl. of Int. Law 706, 717.
5
Ware v_ Hylton, (1796) 3 Lall. (U. S.) 199, 1 L. Ed. 568.
55
The Charming Betsy, (1804) 2 Cranch (U. S.) 64, 118, 2 L. Ed. 208.
5
6Federalist No. 75; 13 Am. Jul. of Int. Law 64.
57
Brown v. United States, (1814) 8 Cranch (U. S.) 110, 125, 3 L. Ed. 504.
See5 8 Dillon's Marshall Vol. I, p. 526.
Brown v. United States, (1814) 8 Cranch (U. S.) 110, 143, 3 L. Ed. 504.
5310 Am.
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nations rests in proof, declared Story, anticipating Marshall's final
opinion by twenty years, that, "by the general consent of nations"
the usage asserted has become incorporated into the code of public law. Thus the modern usage or law of nations "is resorted
to merely as a limitation upon this discretion, not as conferring
the authority to exercise it. ' ' 60 It is a .nice question how far the
m6dern usage of nations, as recognized by the constitution 1 or
established and made of binding force by treaties of the United
States, constrains necessarily "independent substantive power"
arsing from the nature of sovereignty and of the government of
the United States. Marshall in Gibbons v. Ogden62 holds the
commerce power "like all others vested in Congress" to be complete in itself. "It may," he says, "be exercised to its utmost
extent and acknowledges. no limitations other than are prescribed
in.the constitution." But Marshall, himself,6 3 declares the law
of nations to be part of the law of the land, and is the expositor
of its restraining influence upon statutes of Congress. The
wisdom and unfettered discretion of Congress are relied upon to
secure the people from the abuse of power, only in matters upon
which there is no such limitation in the constitution. Story
urged that if the doctrines of the British navigation laws formed
"a part of the law of nations, however mischievous," the United
States must submit until they should be relaxed by "particular
convention." 6" It is apparent then in the view of this great
justice and commentator upon the constitution, that treaties
modifying the rules or the usage or law of nations were paramount in authority to federal statutory enactment: "I hold, with
Bynkershoek (Quaest. Pub. Jur. Ch. 7.) that where such treaties
exist they must be observed.16 5

Mr. Justice Field in Chae Chan

Ping v. United States"6 asserts:
"By the constitution, laws made in pursuance thereof and
treaties made under the authority of the United States are both
declared to be the, supreme law of the land, and no paramount
authority is given to one over the other;" but he adds: "It will
59

Brown v. United States, (1814) 8 Cranch (U. S.) 110, 139, 3 L. Ed. 504.
v. United States, (1814) 8 Cranch (U. S.) 110, 154, 3 L. Ed. 504.
Murray v. Chicago, etc., Ry. Co., (1899) 92 Fed. 868.
62(1824) 9 Wheat. (U. S.) 1, 6 L. Ed. 23. See limitation referred to in
The Brigg Wilson, 1820. p. 428, 436, 438.
63
The Nereide, (1815) 9 Cranch (U. S.) 388, 423, 3 L. Ed. 769.
64
Story; Miscellaneous Writings, 485.
65Brown v. United States, (1814) 8 Cranch (U.S.) 110, 142.
66(1888) 130 U. S. 581, 599, 32 L. Ed. 1068, 9 S. C. R. 623.
66
Brown
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not be presumed that the legislative department of the government will likely pass laws which are in conflict with the treaties
of the country."
His claim is that of rebus sic stantibus: changed circumstances justifying the disregard of treaty stipulations or unavoidable change in foreign policy.or
The early American treaties embraced with commercial objects, stipulations relative to offenses against the laws of nations,68 agreements relative to cases during the war, free bottoms, contraband, rights of war, all of which appear to have been
regarded as within the sphere of legislative power. It should also
be considered that the treaty power was exercised in an entirety
by Congress, during the confederation, and that the legislative
will, in consenting, through treaties of the United States to international regulations of commerce and neutral right was in respect to many of these provisions submitting the future exercise
of its discretion to a paramount law, which was plainly within
the contemplation of the constitution. This is apparent from
contemporaneous opinion. Hamilton writes:
"That treaty stipulations, which are designed to operate in
case of war, preserve their force and obligation when war takes
place;"69 "our treaties and the law of nations form a part of the
67Moore comments on this decision: "It was admitted that the act was
violative of treaties, but it was held that it was within the power of -Congress to exclude aliens from the United States, even though a treaty had
guaranteed them the right to come here and* reside; and to this, extent
it was held that treaties were abrogated. It was not held, as many have
seemed to suppose that a nation may at will rid itself of the obligation
of treaties by abrogating them."
68 "Offences against the law of nations . . . cannot with any accuracy, be said to be completely ascertained and defined in any public code
recognized by the common consent of nations" . . . It is obvious that
this power has an intimate connection and relatibn with the power to
regulate commerce and intercourse with foreign nations, 'and the rights
and duties of the national government in peace and war, arising o,ut
of the
law of'nations. As the United States are responsible to foreign .nations
for all violations of the law of nations, etc. . . . Congress ought to
possess the power . . . Story, Commentaries, par. 1163, 1165; 1.
Tucker's Blacklstone, Comm. App. 268, 9; Rawle, Const. ch. 9 p. 108. Iredell
declared that offenses against the law of nations "must come within the
spheie of Legislative authority which is intrusted with their protection."
Ford, Pamphlets on the Const. 359.
095Hamilton's Works, Lodge Ed. 126. "We think . . . that treaties
stipulating for permanent rights and general arrangements and professing
to aim at perpetuity, and to deal with the case of war as of peace do hot
cease on the occurrence of war, .but are at most, only suspended while it
lasts; and unless they are waived by the parties,or new or repugnant stipu-

lations are made, they revive in their operation at the return of peace."

Society for the Propagation of the Gospel v. New Haven, (1823) 8 Wheat.

(U. S.) 464, 494, 5 L. Ed. 622.
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"an established rule of the law of nations can
law of the land ;,,70
only be altered by agreements between all the civilized powers or
by time; ' ' 71
by a new usage generally adopted and sanctioned
' 72
nations.
of
law
a
make
can
"no one nation
Again he argued that the treaty with Sweden of 1783
"abridged the exercise of the legislative power to regulate trade
* . restraining the legislative power from extending prohibitions to them, which shall not equally extend to other nations the
Jefferson urged that the treaty of 1807 tied
most favored.""
the hands of the United States to retaliate by legislating nonimportation or non-intercourse. ' 74 Washington queries: "What
are the advantages of treaties if they are to be observed no longer
than convenient?" 75 Jay urges that: "No nation can have au'7 6
Jay distinthority to vacate or modify treaties at pleasure.
guishes between treaty contracts and the legislative power which
has no foreign extra-territorial obligation.
We have under the practice of the American government, not
only the phenomena of statutes and treaties operative in the same
field but that of legislative compacts with foreign nations, accomplishing that which the treaty power hag failed to accomplish.
A notable case is exemplified in the repeal of the non-intercourse
law of 1809 in response to the promise of France to conclude
"every species of convention" tending to renew the treaty of commerce with America, etc., if American vessels would not submit
to the British orders in council of 1807; but providing for the
revival of certain sections should England or France continue
their depredations upon American commerce. There was in this
and other instances, complete co6peration between the executive
and the legislative branches. It is a significant fact that our
commercial relations with foreign powers rest today in no small
degree upon a legislative basis. Comparatively recent instances
are to be found in the tariff acts of 1890 and 1897 authorizing
Hamilton's Works, Lodge Ed. 146, Pacificus.
Hamilton's Works, Lodge Ed. 218.
Hamilton's Works, Lodge Ed. 258.
73"The words: 'the most favored nation' used in allthe treaties between
the United States and foreign nations in amity with them, have never been
interpreted to found a jurisdiction exclusive of or inconsistent with the
laws of the United States in our own ports." The St. Olaf, 2 Pet. Adm.
428, Fed. Cas. No. 17,790.
749 Jefferson's Works, Ford Ed. 36.
75
Message to Senate, November 19, 1794. 12 Sparks 491.
76Charge to Grand Jury, (1793) Fed. Cas. No. 6,360.
77
Washburn, 55 Am. L. Rev. 68.
704
714
725
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the executive agreements with foreign nations in respect to reciprocity of duties. The competency of Congress to enact the
terms of compacts in such cases with foreign nations is not
denied. The legislation is contingent and the compact is obviously unilateral in character.
"The real trouble of the law-making branch of the government in dealing with foreign nations is not . . . a matter of
constitutional incompetence . . . ; it grows rather out of certain limitations, which are as inherent as they are obvious:'78
The difficulty, as to conflict between the treaty authority and
the legislative power is more apparent in the case of a treaty of
guaranty and arbitration, a form of treaty which is of instant interest, than in the case of treaties of commerce and navigation.
Thus it has been held that the guaranties under the Panama
treaty of 190379 virtually bind the United States to a declaration
of war in certain contingencies."0 The so-called Bryan ,peace
treaties stipulate for a year of grace before commencing war.8 '
Chief Justice Taft has distinguished8 2 the treaty power:
"Creates the obligation to declare war, or to refrain from so
doing in certain contingencies. That obligation is to be discharged by Congress under its constitutional power to declare
war. If it fails to do so, and thus comply with the bbiding obligation created by the treaty-making power, then it merely breaks
the contract of the government."
This is an admission that the authority of the United States
to makl treaties is inadequate to restrain the exercise of the inherent substantive power of Congress. Does it further- infer that,
within the sphere of Congressional authority, the treaty authority
may not engraft upon the law of nations new and great
principles of the law of nations having paramount obligation
over statutes of the United States? Is it to be implied that there
is a class of government contracts which Congress may invalidate under the constitution or that such treaties are only conditional agreements? The Hon. Charles E. Hughes takes a somewhat different view of this question:
78Ibid.
79Art. 1.
S°Madison objects to giving paramount legislative authority to treaties
since the United States under such a doctrine might "by means of an
alliance with a foreign power be driven into a state of war by the president
and senate, contrary both to the sense of the legislature, and'to the letter
and the spirit of the constitution. Debate on Jay treaty, 1796. 4 Annals
of Congress col 5 and 6.
8112 Am. Jnl. of Int. Law 75.
82
May 26, 1916, before the League to Enforce Peace.
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"Congress alone has the power to declare war and any agreement made by the United States to co~perate in, coercive measures
amounting to war would necessarily be subject to the exercise by
Congress of its unquestioned authority. But this does not mean
that the treaty-making power may not, if it is found to accord
with national interests and policies, aid in forming an international organization believed to be necessary and practicable, although its offer of co~peration in any given contingency must
be subject to the well known conditions which inhere in. our constitutional form of government. Congress, indeed, will have all
its powers, but its course of action will depend upon the world
outlook of the nation.
But the powers of Congress in war as in peace respond to
the rules of the laws of nations. Treaties which commit the government of the United States to territorial guaranties or to arbitration with its necessary limitations upon the war powers of
Congress, must refer themselves to the definite obligations of the
government of the United States under international law, to
which the war and peace authorities of the legislative branch of
the government are necessarily constrained. In this light alone
can it be admitted that a treaty agreement to co6perate in coercive measures amounting to war would as the supreme law of
the land obligate the executive branch of the government until
Congress had legislated either to fulfil the treaty or to repeal it.
Then mere failure of Congress to act would not necessarily
break such an agreement; on the other hand, if the treaty should
not conform to the law of nations in respect to its commitments
to make law, express, or implied, or its guaranties to refrain
therefrom, jointly or severally, the failure of Congress to act
would in reality be its tacit recognition of the unconstitutionality
of the treaty. It is obvious that there are powers of Congress,
subject to the law of nations, quite distinct from its powers to
deal with questions which under the constitution, or "in the light
of international law" are purely of domestic jurisdiction; and
further that not only is the war power, but the authority to regulate commerce and navigation as well, constrained to the observance of the law of nations. 3 These observations, however
cursory, emphasize the principle that not only is the validity of
a treaty made by authority of the United States to be defermined
3
8 "No single nation can change the law of the sea," The Scotia, (1871)
14 Wall. (U. S.) 170, 187, 20 L. Ed. 822. "The constitution itself adopted
and established as part of the laws of the United States approved rules of
the general maritime ,law." Knickerbocker Ice Co. v.* Stewart, (1919)

253, U. S. 149 64 L. Ed. 83, 40 S. C. R. 438.
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by "evidence, internal and external, according to the rules and
maxims of the laws of nations relative to such cases,""' but that
the binding force of the treaty, as of an international contract,
upon Congress, is to be determined by its conformity to those
principles of international law which have achieved the high
sanction of the universal consent of nations. s5 Gallatin declared:
"If the treaty-making power is not limited by existing laws,
or if it repeals laws that clash with it, or if the legislature is
obliged to repeal the laws so clashing, then, the legislative power
in fact resides in the president and Senate and they can pass any
law under color of treaty."
Mr. Adams writes :s1 "The argument is irresistible t it has
never been answered." A century has elapsed; "Whatever may
be the national effect of a treaty which conflicts with the provisions of the constitution, it is generally admitted that it will be
disregarded by the courts ;,,ss
the same must be held of a treaty
in derogation of the law of nations. "By the general law of
nations we certainly are bound."'8 9
The distinction between executive agreements of an international character and treaties is one of no inconsiderable importance. Neither has the zonstitutional power of the chief executive to conclude such conventions, been at all clearly delimited
when one reviews subsisting authorities.
A notable precedent, interesting because of its bearing on the
Disarmament Conference,is the agreement of 1817 forthelimitation of naval forces on the Great Lakes, made and carried into
effect by the executive, though afterward submitted to the
84
85 Correspondence

and Public Papers of John Jay, April 14, 1806.
Davis v. Conordia, (1850) 9 How. U. S. 280, 294, 13 L. Ed. 138, it
was held by the Supreme Court that "the law of nations does not recognize
1n

in a hiation ceding territory the continuance of supreme power over it

after the treaty has been signed or any other exercise or sovereignty than
that which is necessary for social order and common purposes . . .
that if such soverignty could be exercised after a treaty had been signed,
it would be a power to change materially the relations which the people
of a ceded territory had to eah other; and to establish between them and
a new sovereign a different condition than had been contemplated when they
were transferred." The rule "accords with the received usages of nations
in respect of rights acquired under treaties." This indicates that the
obligation
of a treaty of session is to be referred to the law of naions.
88
March "10, 1796 in the House of Representatives, speech on Jav treaty.
87Life of Gallatin, 161.
8829 Harv. L. Rev. 219; Doe v. Braden, (1853) 16 How. (U. S.) 635, 657,
1489L. Ed. 1090.
Peters in Thompson et al. v. Ship Catharina, (1795) 1 Pet. Adm. 104,
Fed. Cas. No. 13,949.
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senate. 90 Another case of more than immediate interest is to be
found in the protocol concluded at Peking, Sept. 7, 1901, between
China and the allied and associated powers, subsequent to the
Boxer uprising. Temporary working arrangements in the matter of modus vivendi agreements are likewise regarded as within
the powers of the president pending action by the treaty-making
authority. Another distinct class of executive agreements is
recognized where the authority is derived from Congressional
enactment.
"It is a peculiarity of these agreements that so long as the
statute under which they are concluded stands unrepealed, they
have precisely the same force as treaties, being in effect laws of
the land." 91
It has been urged that the treaty-making power is not, however, delegated in this class of cases to the president but "that
though every treaty is an agreement, every agreement is not a'
treaty." 92 When authorized by enactment of Congress, negotiated and proclaimed under the authority of the president, the
Supreme Court holds "such a compact is a treaty." 9 3 Constitutional limitations upon the authority of Congress with reference
to change in the accepted law of nations must extend to this class
of joint legislative and executive agreements.
Admitting that "no person acquires a right to the continued
operation of a treaty"9 the fact remains that the security of public or private right under the constitution, laws and treaties of
the United States and very especially under the law of nations
is the implied condition in the legislative abrogation of -the international contracts of this government. This is the basis upon
which is founded all national or private reclamations under
treaties, the principle of equitable indemnification for violation
of treaty rights or those given by the law of nations, and consists with the American doctrine that the law of nations and not
the purely municipal law of the country is the measure of its obligation to other nations.
90
Moore, Treaties and Executive Agreements, 20 Pol. Sci. Q. 390; see
also
5 Moore, In. Dig. 169, Report of Mr. Foster, Secretary of State.
9
'Ibid.
9219 Harv. L. Rev. 69.
93B. Altman & Co. -v. United States, (1911) 224 U. S. 583, 600, 56 I4. Ed.
894,
32 S. C. R. 593.
94
Rainey v. United States, (1913) 232 U. S. 310, 58 1- Ed. 617, 34
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